Suchergebnisse

This dissertation includes six articles tied together by the overarching question of how changes in public opinion, economics and public policy co-evolve in mature democracies, with a focus on redistributive (in seven European democracies) and secessionist preferences (in Catalonia and Scotland). The theoretical inspiration derives from three sources: 1. the Macro Polity model by Erikson, MacKuen/Stimson, 2. the Thermostatic Responsiveness model by Soroka and Wlezien, and 3. the literature on representation gap models by Gilens, Elsaesser and others. The Macro Polity and Thermostatic Responsiveness models come with an optimistic undertone, emphasizing that public policies adapt to public opinion, producing the policy-opinion congruence that defines responsive government. The Representation Gap model, by contrast, is more pessimistic in highlighting that the preferences of low-income groups are generally worse represented in public policies than the preferences of middle-income and especially high-income groups. While there is evidence in favor of these models for the majoritarian political systems in the US, Canada and the UK, less is known about the validity of these models in proportional democracies of continental Europe. The contributions in this dissertation address this research gap by integrating the three models and combining nearly 500 surveys to study the evolution of European public opinion at the national and subnational level. ; Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus sechs Artikel. Sie beantworten diet übergreifenden Frage, wie sich Veränderungen in der öffentlichen Meinung, in der Wirtschaft und public policies in etablierten Demokratien gemeinsam entwickeln. Der Schwerpunkt die Arbeit liegt auf politischen Präferenzen für Umverteilung und Sezession (Katalonien und Schottland). Theoretisch speist sich die Arbeit aus drei Quellen und verbindet diese miteinander: 1. das Macro Polity-Modell von Erikson, MacKuen und Stimson, 2. dem dem Thermostatic Responsiveness-Modell von Soroka und Wlezien und 3. die Literaturstränge des Representation-Gap Modells von Gilens, Elsaesser und anderen. Die ersten beiden Stränge, das Macro Polity-Modell und Thermostatic Responsiveness weisen einen optimistischen Unterton auf. Sie stellen in den Vordergrund, dass sich Public Policies der öffentlichen Meinung anpasst. So werde die Kongruenz zwischen Politik und öffentlicher Meinung, die die responsive Regierung ausmacht, ständig reproduziert. Im Gegensatz dazu ist das das Representation-Gap Modell pessimistischer. Dieses Modell betont, dass die Präferenzen von Gruppen mit niedrigem Einkommen in der Politik seltener Beachtung finden und ihre Policy-Präferenzen im Allgemeinen seltener umgesetzt werden, als die Präferenzen von Gruppen mit mittlerem Einkommen und insbesondere hohem Einkommen. Es liegen bereits empirische Befunde für beide Modelle in den Mehrheitssystemen der USA, Kanada und Großbritannien vor; deren Gültigkeit in den Proporzdemokratien Kontinentaleuropas ist jedoch weniger gut erforscht. Die Beiträge in dieser Dissertation schließen diese Forschungslücke, indem sie die drei Modelle integrieren und fast 500 Umfragen kombinieren, um die Entwicklung der europäischen öffentlichen Meinung auf nationaler und subnationaler Ebene zu untersuchen.

AbstractUsing data from 177 surveys, this study examines the evolution of mass preferences in Catalonia from 1991 to 2018, measuring (a) territorial preferences and (b) the central tendency of public opinion in the left–right scale. Consistent with previous research, I find that the political centre in the left–right scale of a subnational public opinion moves in an orderly manner in reaction to economics and both national and subnational incumbents. In contrast, demands for decentralization or independence do not systematically react to economic and political stimuli. Additionally, I find that, more and more, rises in support for independence are correlated with left‐wing shifts in public opinion.

This article takes the Yellow Vests (YVs, Gilets Jaunes) movement as a case in point to study the mechanisms by which social media can enhance protest participation. Building on the literature on social media and protest behaviour, we study the association between different political experiences on social media and protest engagement. We rely on novel survey data from the project YELLOWPOL collected in France in 2019 during a period characterised by the mobilisation of the YVs. We find that individuals' experiences on social media play a role in connecting general social media use with their participation in protests. Specifically, we show that simply using social media cannot predict protest behaviour, but seeking content from the accounts of decision-makers and activists and using social media to express opinions contributes to protest participation. These findings enhance the understanding of the individual-level mechanisms linking social media use and protest behaviour in first-wave democracies, expanding existing knowledge on the use and consequences of Internet-mediated technology on political participation and political change.

Most research on corruption attitudes focuses exclusively on voters, despite the strategic role of political elites in anticorruption efforts. To fill this research gap, we study the drivers of perceptions of corruption among legislators, using comparative longitudinal survey data of over 3000 policymakers in 18 Latin American countries. We develop a novel theoretical framework based on the influence of motivated reasoning and the moderating effect of the economic context. Our results suggest that legislators supporting the government systematically perceive lower levels of corruption in contexts of economic growth. Conversely, opposition legislators consistently consider corruption an important issue, regardless of the macroeconomic situation. Since the perceptions of corruption for legislators supporting the government are dependent on the economic context, our results show that both government and opposition legislators are likely to perceive corruption as a relevant issue during economic downturns, suggesting that economic crises can open windows of opportunity for anticorruption reforms.

This paper analyzes the extent to which ideology has influenced political elite's trust in the armed forces in Latin America between 1994 and 2018. During this period, which scholars have associated with three political cycles, the armed forces have been one of the most trusted institutions by both the representative elite and the public. We analyze the relationship between political elites' trust towards the military in 16 parliaments in the region, delving into the dynamics of ideological convergence and polarization throughout this period and particularly during the governments of the new left. Our results show significant differences by ideology in elites' trust towards the military in most countries, as well as opposite temporal dynamics between groups of countries. In countries such as Brazil, Chile or Uruguay, in which the shift to the left led to the arrival of a moderate left, we observe a process of ideological convergence towards higher levels of trust in the armed forces, while the arrival of a radical left in countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua or Bolivia, triggered an increase in ideological polarization over the armed forces among the parliamentary elite. ; Este trabajo analiza en qué medida la ideología ha influido en la confianza de las élites políticas hacia las fuerzas armadas latinoamericanas entre 1994 y 2018. Durante este periodo, que la literatura ha asociado con tres ciclos políticos, las fuerzas armadas han sido una de las instituciones mejor valoradas tanto por la élite representativa como por la ciudadanía. Analizamos la relación entre las valoraciones de las élites políticas hacia los militares de 16 parlamentos de la región, profundizando en las dinámicas de convergencia y polarización ideológica a lo largo de este periodo y particularmente durante los gobiernos de la nueva izquierda. Nuestro análisis de una serie de encuestas a más de 7,500 parlamentarios muestra diferencias significativas por ideología sobre la confianza de la élite en las fuerzas armadas en la mayoría de los ...

Abstract
Citizens' support for redistribution varies largely between and within countries. An important empirical challenge in this field is the scarcity of comparative data, which this study overcomes by designing a novel time-series cross-sectional dataset that spans more than three decades in seven European countries. Using nearly 300 surveys and a dyadic ratios algorithm, we estimate aggregate redistributive preferences for each country, as well as for population strata within countries based on household income. We then ask to what extent support for redistribution varies across the rich and the poor. We find that citizens are not systematically becoming more reluctant toward or more supportive of redistribution. While redistributive preferences of the rich and the poor do not strictly move in parallel, there is no polarization between the two. Moreover, both the demand for redistribution and the preference gap between the rich and the poor evolve in a cyclical way.